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European integration is likely to affect labour market performance through various 
routes. One important channel is the effects product market integration has on labour 
markets. This paper reviews how product market integration may strengthen labour 
market interdependencies between integrating economies and therefore affect both 
the level of employment and the flexibility by which wages adjust to shocks. It is 
argued that inherent in the integration process are forces which tend to make wage 
less flexible which implies that more employment variability may follow, even 
though the average level of employment may increase. Stronger wage inter-
dependencies and also nominal convergence may thus be beneficial for both the 
level of employment and the objective of price stability, but it may come at the cost 
of greater volatility in employment, that is, nominal convergence but real 
divergence. 
  This paper was initiated while visiting the European Commission DG Economic 
and Financial Affairs as a Visiting Fellow. I gratefully acknowledge this opportunity 
and interactions with members of the research unit. Comments and suggestions from 
anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.  I would also like to thank Henrik 
Simonsen for efficient research assistance. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The characteristics of European labour markets are centre stage to many policy 
issues. Structural problems causing impediments in the adjustment process are 
widely perceived to be a key reason for persistent unemployment problems in a 
number of European countries. Furthermore the formation of the European 
monetary union is often taken to put further demands on the flexibility of wages 
to compensate for lack of (national) instruments to deal with asymmetric shocks. 
In the absence of such increased flexibility asymmetries and differences in 
labour market performance across European countries may increase, and this 
may in turn lead to a stronger pressure for monetary policy to be concerned with 
output stability alongside price stability.  However, labour market structures and 
institutions may adapt as a response to the integration process, and therefore it is 
necessary to evaluate the mechanisms through which labour markets could be 
affected by integration to evaluate the need for structural labour market reforms. 
At a global level integration is driven by both political decisions and 
technological changes lowering information and transport costs. In a European 
perspective the single market, the common monetary policy and the enlargement 
are all adding to the integration process. For real economic activities, trade 
statistics confirm that trade flows within Europe have increased rapidly, but EU 
as an area is not significantly more open to trade with the rest of the world today 
than it was 40 years ago (OECD (1999)). This indicates the strength or bias of 
the European integration process relative to possible “globalization forces” in 
trade of goods and services. The volume of trade in EU now amounts to more 
than 120% of value added for the manufacturing sector (Andersen, Haldrup and 
Sørensen (2000)), and it is associated with further specialization (Midelfart-
Knarvik et al. 2000). Trade growth is concentrated in intra-industrial trade 
(OECD (2002)), which is important since it shows an increase in trade in 
products for which the production is not dependent on access to specific natural 
resources (as is often the case for inter-industrial trade) or for which it is 
possible to split-up the value added chain via various forms of outsourcing. Both 
of the above-mentioned effects imply that the location of production across 
European countries becomes more sensitive to the profitability of production. 
Importantly, the increase in trade flows also reflects that the boundary for which 
commodities and services can be traded across borders is continuously 
changing, and e.g. service activities which previously were considered non-
tradeables are increasingly becoming tradeables (banking, graphical work etc.). 
A further factor strengthening the above-mentioned mechanisms is the increase 
in foreign direct investments (see e.g. UNCTAD (2002)). The formation of the 
European monetary union is expected to be a further catalyst for the ongoing 
integration process, although the quantitative importance of exchange risk for 
trade flows and market integration is disputed. 
While no significant changes in labour mobility within the EU have yet 
been observed (OECD (1999)), it is important to point out that changes in 
product markets induced by international integration may have important 
implications for labour markets. This link runs via several channels including 
more competition over market shares in domestic and foreign markets, easier 
room for relocation of production (outsourcing) across national labour markets, 
and relocation of firms (FDIs). All of these changes can be summarized as 
implying that job mobility across European labour markets increases, or to put it 
differently, the sensitivity of employment to domestic conditions (relative to that 
of other European countries) increases.
1 Hence, even if labour mobility across 
                                                 
1  A separate issue is migration into the current EU-area and enlargement, which is not 
addressed in this paper.   3 
European labour markets remain quantitatively important, it follows that job 
mobility is enhanced as a consequence of integration, and therefore labour 
markets are affected. 
The effects of product market integration for labour markets is often 
summarized as implying that the elasticity of employment to wages increases 
(Burda (1999), Andersen, Haldrup and Sørensen (2000)), and therefore wage 
setters face a more steep trade-off between wages and employment, which 
would induce wage moderation. For this reason it is also often hypothesized that 
product market integration is alike a structural reform making labour markets 
more flexible. The argument being that the increased job mobility changes 
incentives underlying wage formation by reducing the scope for appropriating 
rents which in turn induce wage moderation. 
  This paper is an attempt to evaluate to what extent product market 
integration can be expected to make labour markets more flexible. This involves 
both a consideration of the implications for the structural unemployment level 
but also the speed by which wages adjust to various shocks affecting the labour 
market. The latter issue has been somewhat neglected in the literature
2, but it is 
important to address whether labour market changes will tend to mitigate or 
reinforce the sources of asymmetric business cycle developments across 
countries integrating. 
  The paper starts out in section 2 by a brief presentation of current 
institutional changes in EU labour markets, which can be directly related to the 
integration process. This section also reports some empirical evidence on wage 
developments across EU countries. The effects of product market integration on 
structural unemployment are addressed in section 3 and related to the 
implication they may have for equilibrium employment and therefore the 
structural unemployment rate. Section 4 turns to the business cycle implications 
of these structural changes and addresses the implications for the adjustment of 
wages to shocks, and thereby the volatility of employment. A few concluding 
remarks are given in section 5. An appendix gives some theoretical results 
referred to in the text. 
  
 
2 Institutional  and  empirical evidence 
 
Casual evidence suggests that a “European” element is playing a larger role in 
labour markets. Wage setting is often explicitly made with a reference to the 
“European norm” and the concern to have nominal wage increases to develop in 
accordance with the overall monetary objective of low and stable inflation. In 
specific cases it is also quite visible that the improved “exit option” of 
employers affects labour market bargaining. Restructuring and employment 
reductions by multinationals like Danone and Marks and Spencer are two 
examples which attracted substantial media attention. They were widely 
interpreted as examples of the Europeanisation of labour markets and the 
flexibility by which firms operating in several European countries can relocate 
production and thus employment to the advantage of the firm and the 
disadvantage of the incumbent work force. Another important example is the 
Volkswagen agreement in 2001, which led to more flexible work conditions and 
wage moderation. In the latter case it was quite clear that the management 
explicitly used the argument that production could be relocated if the outcome 
would not be satisfactory for the management. 
                                                 
2 There has been some work done on how a move towards lower inflation might affect wage 
formation and nominal rigidity, see e.g. Calmfors (2001) for a discussion and references.   4 
  This section takes a brief look at institutional and empirical developments in 
EU labour markets to assess the extent to which European integration can be 
said to have affected the process of wage determination. The extent to which 
convergence in actual wage developments can be observed across European 
labour markets is also addressed. 
 
2.1 Institutional changes 
 
In union circles there has been an increasing recognition of the transnational 
character of labour market issues, and the fact that the labour market 
interdependencies are being strengthened due to further European integration. 
Already in 1973 the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) – a 
networking organisation for unions in European countries – was set up. The aim 
was to ensure a better representation and louder voice for labour interest in 
European policy debates and with the objective of preventing any kind of social 
and wage dumping. 
  Transnational cooperation is taking place at the sectorial level within 
European industry federations of which there currently are 11 (Dufresne 
(2002)). The federations represent workers in various contexts and aim at 
coordinating wage bargaining. The coordination is through information sharing 
and comparisons of collective bargaining systems and outcomes. Some are 
aiming at setting minimum standards and rules as well as quantitative objectives 
to be followed in national negotiations. Four federations have established their 
own collective bargaining committees: metal-workers (1993), graphical workers 
(1995), workers in mining/chemicals/energy (1996) and workers in 
textile/clothing/ leather (1997) and more may follow (Dufresne (2002)). 
  At the sectorial level there are also cross-border initiatives where unions 
from a few countries join effort with a regional perspective to share information 
and prevent undercutting mechanisms in wages and related issues. 
  At the European level different steps have been taken to foster a social 
dialogue on matters related to labour market and social policy issues, and more 
recently to ensure wage developments in accordance with the overall objective 
of price stability for EMU member countries (European Commission 2000, 
2002)). The social dialogue process was initiated in 1985 with the so-called Val 
Duchesse process for bipartite bodies at the industry level. These were 
autonomous endeavours aiming at exchange of information and providing the 
participants a possibility of issuing opinions. The process has since been 
formalised and the Treaty now requires (Article 138) that social partners shall be 
consulted in two stages, namely, both on the need for and the possible direction 
of community action as well as on its content. The Treaty stipulates (Article 
139) that implementation can take place either via voluntary agreement and 
adoption in national agreements or via the Council in the form of directives. 
  Directives have been launched on issues like equal treatment, health and 
safety. An example of a directive leading to an institutional arrangement, which 
explicitly takes account of increased cross-country activities of firms, is the 
directive on European work council (EWC). A EU directive from 1994 requires 
companies employing more than 1000 workers in the EU of which 150 are in at 
least two member countries to establish a EWC. In 2002 there were 1874 such 
councils. The councils are a forum for consultation and information sharing on 
labour issues including cross-border company policy as well as information 
sharing and consultation. The councils do not play any direct role in wage 
negotiations. 
  The Broad Economic Policy guidelines (see e.g. OECD 2002) also include 
labour market issues stressing the need for nominal wage developments to be in 
accordance with the inflation objectives and real wage developments to be in   5 
line with productivity. The macroeconomic dialogue is taking place within the 
Cologne process with participation of social partners, the Council, the 
Commission and representatives of the ECB with the aim of providing a forum 
for information exchange among the key macroeconomic actors in the EU. 
  The Luxembourg process aims at improving the functioning of labour markets. 
Policy coordination of labour market policies primarily relies on information 
exchange through monitoring of labour market developments and the sharing of 
best practices as well as peer pressure to reach certain goals. Accordingly, 
certain targets have been agreed for, e.g. the employment rate (Lisbon 2000: to 
be at least 70% by 2010), the employment of old workers (Stockholm 2001: to 
be at least 50% for the age group 55-64 by 2010) and to reduce early retirement 
(Barcelona 2002: effective retirement age to increase by 5 years by 2010). The 
recent Employment Guidelines focus on four pillars (employability, 
entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities) on which labour market 
policies should be built. 
 
 
European wage norms 
The importance of the “European” element in wage formation, that is, the 
increased focus on competitiveness following from intensified integration is 
visible in all EU labour markets. In various countries a “European norm” has 
playedeither an explicit or implicit role in wage formation. An interesting 
example is the Belgian “law on competitiveness” from 1996 which explicitly 
linked wage increase to wage increases for its main competitors (Germany, the 
Netherlands and France). This prompted the so-called “Doorn initiative”, which 
involves unions in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. The “Doorn initiative” is not an attempt at establishing 
transnational wage bargaining, but rather an initiative which through exchange 
of information and peer pressure aims at avoiding a process of “competitive” 
wage cuts, or competition between different national collective bargaining 
systems. The initiative has launched a “wage coordination formula” which 
defines the room for nominal wage increases as the sum of inflation and 
productivity growth
3. The intention is to have a norm “protecting” the labour 
share, and ensure a level playing field to avoid undercutting. There is, however, 
some ambiguity as how to interpret the norm in respect to which measure to use 
for inflation and productivity. In recent years the norm has also been interpreted 
more flexible to take into account qualitative aspects like work environment, 
flexible working hours, training etc. 
  While the current status of these initiatives is open to discussion, they are 
interesting in the sense that they reflect recognition of increased 
interdependencies in wage formation. While transnational wage bargaining at 
present is an unlikely response, the initiatives are a way of trying to minimize 
the possible externalities involved in wage setting. 
   
 
European wage setting institutions 
European labour markets differ in a number of respects. The institutional set-up 
of wage bargaining differs across countries as does the relation between parties 
in the labour market and the political system
4. Table 1 summarizes some 
indicators on labour market institutions across EU-countries. 
                                                 
3 Wage norms or formulas like this have a long history, and were e.g. a core element of the 
so-called Scandinavian inflation model. 
4 A difference between a regulation of labour markets based on legal rules and one based on 
acceptance of the regulations agreed upon by the parties in the labour market.   6 
 
   
Table 1: Wage bargaining in EU 2001-2002 
     
Country  Centralization¹  Dates of agreement + duration² 
AUS 0,648  1-year  agreement 
BEL  0,422  2-year agreement signed at the end of 2000 
DEU  0,243  Most covered by 2 years contracts 
DNK  0,341  4 year contracts for private sector (March 2000) 
GRC  0,284  2-year agreement (May 2000) 
ESP  0,343  Average of 3 year agreements 
FIN  0,465  Incomes policy agreement 2001-02 
FRA  0,079  1 year agreements 
IRL  0,759  Partnership 2000-2003 (April 2000) 
ITA  0,324  Different dates and durations 
LUX  NA  No fixed dates 
NLD  0,393  Different dates and durations 
PRT 0,284  1-year  duration 
SWE  0,389  3-year agreement 2001-2004 (April) 
GBR  0,141  Different dates and durations 
         
Notes: 1) Based on the centralization index reported in Booth et al. (2000), the index is 
defined to belong to the unit interval, where 0 and 1 defines the lowest and highest degree of 
centralization/coordination of labour markets; 2) based on Mermet (2002) and EIRO. 
 
  Recently a tendency towards more decentralized wage setting has been 
observed in many countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Sweden and the UK) although the opposite has also happened (Ireland) (see 
Boeri et al. 2001). However, although some decentralization of wage setting is 
taking place this is not necessarily tantamount to a deregulation of the labour 
market, and in some cases it is more appropriate to talk of “centralized 
decentralization” since some centralized control remains, despite more 
decentralized wage setting. This centralized element is important since it means 
that some overall norm building in wage setting remains, despite the increased 
decentralized leverage implied by these changes. 
 
 
2.2 Wage developments 
 
The development in the level and dispersion (measured by its standard 
deviation) of aggregate nominal wage increases for all EU-countries (except 
Portugal) for the period 1971 to 2001 is given in figure 1
5. It is seen that average 
nominal wage increases have come down particularly in the 1990s during the 
preparation phase up to and after the establishment of the European and 
Monetary Union. Nominal wage increases have thus fairly quickly adapted to 
the low inflation environment, which must be taken as a sign that this process 
quickly established credibility. The dispersion in wage increases has also been 
reduced over this period, as could be expected given the lower average level of 
nominal wage increases. However, the coefficient of variation – the ratio of the 
standard deviation to the mean of nominal wage increases – has not been 
reduced. It is also interesting to observe that the reduction in the dispersion of 
wage increases is preceding the run up to EMU as there is a trend decline from 
                                                 
5 Wages are total wage costs per hour paid by firms. 
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the early 1980s and onwards (see also Hofer and Pichelman (1999) and 
Pichelman (2001)). 
     
Figure 1 
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  One way to assess the extent to which the competitive pressure is 
influencing wage setting is to consider whether there is a convergence in 
domestic wages to foreign wages (measured in domestic currency), i.e. relative 
wages or wage competitiveness. Figure 2 plots the relative wage for all EU 
countries (except Portugal) measured as the domestic wage relative to the 
country-specific foreign wage (defined as wages in other EU countries weighted 
by the importance these countries have for the particular countries' foreign 
trade). Stronger wage interdependence between trading partners due to market 
integration should be expected to make this relative measure approach unity 
(from above or below). Despite the richness of the figure some convergence is 
obvious for a group of core countries (excluding Germany, the upper line during 
the 1990s and Greece, the lower line). Figure 3 displays the development in the 
dispersion of relative wages or wage competitiveness for all countries included 
and by excluding Germany and Greece. Measured in this way there is clearly 
less dispersion today than at the start of the sample period, but it is equally clear 
that most of the convergence took place during the 1980s.  
 
Figure 1   8 
Relative wages: EU countries


















Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden UK
 
One interpretation is that the real adjustment which has taken place happened 
during the 1980s, while the development since then more reflects the 
convergence in inflation, that is, during the 1990s there has been more nominal 
than real convergence. 
  That wage setting is being affected by integration is supported by empirical 
evidence reported in Andersen, Haldrup and Sørensen (2000). It is found that 
wages tend to move more similar between countries the stronger their trade 
links. In a time-varying parameter estimation of wage equations it is also found 
for a number of countries that wage formation has come to follow foreign wage 
developments more closely. 
  Evidence on the role of trade for wage formation is also found in a number 
of studies using trade measures (imports, exports etc) as a proxy for market 
integration. Bernhard and Jensen (1999a,b) find that exporting firms tend to 
have higher productivity and pay higher wages, with the causality running from 
productivity to exports. Other studies have found that import penetration tends 
to lower wages (see e.g. Revenga (1992), Nicoletti et al. (2001) and Jean and 
Nicoletti (2002). The fact that product market regulations are found to matter for 
labour market performance (see OECD 2002) is a further indication that product 
market integration may have important implications for labour market 
performance. This runs both via the deregulations following further product 
market integration, but also the indirect effects (see below) arising from easier 
market access, competition for market shares and options for relocation of 
production. 
   
Figure 3 
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Business Cycles and Wage Adjustment 
Another issue is the extent to which dispersion in wage changes across European 
countries reflects that business cycles are asymmetric. If so one should expect to 
find a positive relation between the dispersion of e.g. GDP growth rates and the 
dispersion in nominal wage changes. Figure 4 indicates that such a positive 
relation is present. However, the correlation between nominal wage changes and 
GDP growth is falling, since the correlation was 0.74 over the period 1971-80, 
0.62 over the period 1981-1990 and 0.56 over the period 1991-2002. This 
suggests that nominal wage changes to a lesser extent than previously reflect 
differences in business cycle developments. 
    Accordingly, the empirical evidence suggests that there has been some 
strengthening of wage interdependencies with some convergence of nominal 
wage increases across European countries but also that wages to a lesser extent 
respond to domestic labour market conditions, that is, the nominal convergence 
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3 Product  market  integration and wage formation 
 
A growing literature is exploring the effects product market integration may 
have on the wage formation process and also on the institutional setting of wage 
bargaining systems. The starting point of the literature is the recognition that 
product market conditions critically determine the room for wage bargaining 
between firms/employers and workers/unions (Dowrick (1989)). Imperfectly 
competitive markets leave rents and the bargaining process then settles the 
division of this rent between the two sides of the market depending on 
bargaining power and outside options. Moreover, product market conditions are 
crucial for the sensitivity of employment to wage changes, which is important 
for the aggressiveness of wage earners in wage bargaining since this determines 
the trade-off between wages and employment. This leads to the insight that 
product market integration can affect wage formation by affecting rents, threat 
points and the sensitivity of employment to wages. 
  To set the scene for an outline of the basic mechanisms, consider the 
following simple wage setting problem. Unions are determining wages with a 
concern for both real wages and employment, and taking into account that firms 
determine employment. This is the standard monopoly union variant of the 
right-to-manage model. It is well-known that it captures the qualitative 
implications of more rich bargaining models quite well. Specifically, assume 
that the union in country i has an objective function defined over wages and 







 ;   1
 
where Wi is the nominal wage, Pi the consumer price index, and employment Li 
determined according to the following labour demand relation 




;   1
 
where  W* is the relevant foreign wage (wage competitiveness matters for 
employment), and Zi is an indicator of productivity. To simplify other variables 
of importance for employment are neglected to focus on the interdependencies 
arising in wage setting. 





  1 DLi
1 (1)  
 
implying that the real wage demands are increasing in the level of employment. 
For the present discussion the interesting factor is 
1 − θ
θ , which gives the mark-up 
of real wages over the disutility of work. 
Note that 1
1
   ≥
− θ
θ   and decreasing in θ, that is, the less elastic labour demand is, 
the higher the mark-up. 
       From equation (1) one key implication of product market integration for 
wage formation follows readily. For reasons outlined below, international 
product market integration is likely to increase the elasticity of labour demand (θ 
increases), and the more elastic labour demand is the lower the wage demands at 
any employment level, that is, product market integration tends to induce wage 
moderation.  Through this route product market integration may thus reduce 
wage “mark-ups”, and therefore lead to a higher steady state level of 
employment.   11 
    Different mechanisms releasing this “elasticity-effect” have been considered 
in the literature.  One important mechanism runs via market penetration in the 
context of so-called reciprocal dumping. The setting is one where domestic 
firms enjoy some rents because it is difficult or costly for foreign firms to 
penetrate into the market, and vice versa for foreign markets. The possibilities of 
reaping rents in product market affect wage setting and employment. However, 
lower trade frictions make market penetration easier, and it becomes more 
profitable for the domestic firm to expand its production for the foreign market 
to reap some of the rent present in that market, and vice versa for foreign firms 
with respect to the domestic market. The net result is thus penetration into both 
domestic and foreign markets, product market rents fall and as a consequence 
wages fall
6. It is a further implication that wage interdependencies between 
national labour markets are strengthened (see e.g. Andersen and Sørensen 
(2000)). One main attraction of models of reciprocal dumping is that they can 
explain intra-industrial trade even in the form of two-way trade in identical 
commodities. A disadvantage is that the latter form of trade is seldomly 
observed, and that the model relies on Cournot competition (see Krugman 
(1995)). 
   An alternative approach focusses on comparative advantages and the fact 
that trade frictions may be an impediment to the most efficient allocation of 
production across countries. Lower trade frictions will thus imply a reallocation 
of production according to comparative advantages. Simultaneously, there will 
be an increase in imports and exports, alongside more specialization and an 
increase in intra-industrial trade (Andersen and Skaksen (2003)). An important 
point is that the elasticity of labour demand is larger than the elasticity implied 
by the underlying demands for products. The reason being that a change in 
(relative) wages will induce a change in market shares in both domestic and 
foreign markets. An important lesson from this type of model is the need to 
distinguish between the partial equilibrium effects and the general equilibrium 
effects. It is thus possible that the wage mark-up (wages relative to disutility of 
labour) decreases, but real wages and employment unambiguously increase in 
equilibrium. The latter reflects aggregate welfare gains from product market 
integration arising via further specialization and a better allocation of production 
given the comparative advantages prevailing. Note that comparative advantages 
prevailing at a given point in time can reflect the consequences of innovation 
activities, exploitation of economies of scale, gains from agglomeration etc. 
  The threat points in wage bargaining may also change in the process of 
product market integration. In principle this can go either to the benefit for 
workers and firms. In the short run the threat point of workers may be 
strengthened since an abruption of production may be more problematic in a 
more competitive and integrated product market (e.g. through the importance of 
reliable deliveries etc.). On the other hand the possibility of relocating 
production via FDI or outsourcing improves the threat point of firms. The latter 
effect is likely to be larger than the former. The possibility of relocation 
production through FDIs can be interpreted as either an improvement in the exit 
option or threat point of firms or as an increase in the wage elasticity of labour 
demand (in the medium to long run) and this may lower wage mark-ups along 
the lines explained above (see Driffill and Ploeg (1995)). Looking in more detail 
on the possibilities of relocating production or part of it via FDIs or outsourcing 
it is useful to make a distinction between horizontal and vertical investments 
(see Markusen et al. 1996). By horizontal investments is understood that 
                                                 
6 This results does not hold unambiguously, see e.g. Naylor (1998) and Andersen and 
Sørensen (2003). 
   12 
production is split between similar plants located in different countries (labour 
markets), whereas vertical investments is characterized by production being split 
up in separate stages which are placed in different countries (labour markets). 
For horizontal investments (see Bughin and Vannini (1995), Zhao (1995, 1998) 
and Naylor and Santoni (1997)), the general finding is that it leads to wage 
moderation via essentially the elasticity effect discussed above. However, for 
vertical investments this need not be the case for the segment of the labour 
market attached to the production remaining in the home country. The reason is 
that domestic labour costs come to weigh less in overall costs and therefore it is 
possible that labour demand becomes less elastic and therefore wages increase 
for this group of workers, see Skaksen and Sørensen (2001). 
  Finally, international integration may be a separate cause of institutional 
changes in the labour market. Product market integration may affect the 
institutional structure through various routes. First, it is a straightforward 
implication that the effective degree of centralization in the labour market falls if 
product market integration leads to an increase in the number of firms 
competing in product markets, since this implies that the number of unions 
supplying labour to produce a certain type of commodities increases. This 
decrease in the effective degree of centralization has an ambiguous effect on 
labour markets, essentially because it depends on how the initial situation is 
positioned relative to an eventual hump-shaped relation between say wages and 
the degree of centralization (Danthine and Hunt (1994) and Driffill and Ploeg 
(1993)). Second, product market integration may be a reason for changing 
institutional arrangements in the labour market. Focussing on rent extraction 
Santoni (2002) shows that a reduction in product market rents (via improved 
possibilities for reciprocal dumping) following integration implies a reduction in 
the incentive for both unions and firms to have centralized wage bargaining. 
Along the same lines Gaston (2002) argues that the improvement in the outside 
opportunity of firms created by easier room for FDIs, outsourcing etc. can 
explain a shift towards more decentralized bargaining. Product market 
integration may also increase the costs of keeping wages out of line with 
productivity since domestic wage formation is less shielded from outside 
influences the higher various forms of trade frictions. Accordingly, a reduction 
in trade frictions increases the pressure for having a wage determination system 
allowing for wages to adjust to productivity, see Andersen (2002). Since this 
process tends to be accompanied by reductions in bargaining power in labour 
markets, it follows that decentralized wage formation may be observed 
simultaneously with a reduction in unemployment. 
  It is an implication of most of the arguments given above, if workers loose 
some bargaining power due to product market integration, some power can be 
regained by entering into transnational cooperative arrangements for wage 
setting. This shows that there is a stronger incentive for unions to cooperate, but 
it does not address the question how this should be implemented (a non-trivial 
problem given the substantial differences in labour market institutions across EU 
countries). However, the tighter integration of product market and its 
consequences for labour markets, may eventually be the process which puts 
momentum to the manifesto “workers in all countries unite”? 
  To sum up, the basic lesson of the work referred above is that product 
market integration very likely may lead to a reduction in the effective bargaining 
power of labour and therefore a reduction in “wage mark-ups”. A consequence 
of this is an increase in the equilibrium level of employment, and therefore a 
reduction in the structural unemployment rate. In this sense product market 
integration is an indirect structural labour market reform. However, this does not 
address the equally important question of the adjustment of wages to shocks, 
and therefore the business cycle implications of tighter integration. An issue,   13 
which especially within the EMU is important given the potential conflict 
between a common monetary policy and asymmetric shocks. Surprisingly, this 




4 Product market integration and labour market 
flexibility 
 
The aim of the following is to review the consequences stronger wage 
interdependencies may have for both the level and volatility of employment. 
  Return to the illustrative wage setting problem considered in section 3. The 
wage relation (1) implies that there are wage interdependencies between trading 
partners. Considering the sensitivity of domestic wage setting to foreign wages 










1    1
 0( 2 )  
 
Clearly this elasticity lies between 0 and 1, that is, an increase in foreign wages 
leads to an upward pressure on domestic wages. The intuition is straightforward, 
the higher the foreign wage, the higher can domestic wages be without 
jeopardizing competitiveness and thus employment. The important point is that 
this wage interdependence is stronger the more integrated the product markets 
(that is, the higher θ). In technical terms, the more product markets are 
integrated the stronger the strategic complementarity
7 in wage setting among 
labour markets. 
  The next observation concerns adjustments to shocks. The impact effect of a 
domestic productivity shock on domestic wage setting measured by the elasticity 
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Higher productivity leads to higher wage demands, because labour demand 
increases. Importantly, the sensitivity of domestic wages to domestic 
productivity shocks is smaller, the more product markets are integrated (the 
larger θ). 
  Combining the two observations made here in relation to equation (2) and 
(3)  suggests that more integrated product markets imply that more weight in 
wage formation is attached to the wages of competitors and less to domestic 
market conditions. The reason is that when markets are more integrated  (more 
elastic labour demand) the consequences of having e.g. wage developments out 
of line with that of competitors become more severe. However, when wage 
setting is more influenced by the wages prevailing elsewhere it follows that 
employment may become more sensitive to local (country-specific) shocks. 
  Building on this insight and taking it into an explicit macroeconomic setting 
would allow an analysis of the implications for adjustment and fluctuations. The 
model used in the following is a simple but standard macromodel (the details of 
                                                 
7 Strategic complementarity is defined as a positive relation between decision variables, cf. 
Cooper and John (1995). The case of a negative relationship between decision variables is 
denoted strategic substitutability.   14 
the model are laid out in the appendix). It is a general equilibrium model for N 
countries trading in differentiated commodities. While the model is specific, the 
points illustrated are more general since they build on the insights above on 
product market integration and wage determination as well as a large literature 
on wage and price flexibility. As above the focus is on an increase in the 
substitution possibilities between domestic and foreign markets (firms) due to 
further product market integration (θ) causing demands to become more elastic. 
The reason for taking this indirect approach is that an explicit modelling of 
market integration becomes technically complicated, and is therefore avoided 
here for the sake of simplicity. Andersen and Skaksen (2003) present a model 
with integration interpreted as reducing various forms of trade frictions, and 
which lead to similar reduced form relations as used here.  The following reports 
some general equilibrium results, and they are reported in the form of numerical 
illustrations which are more accessible than theoretical derivations. The 
illustrations are solely for pedagogical purposes and should not be interpreted as 
a calibration or an attempt at forecasting the quantitative implications of 
European integration. The details of the model and theoretical derivations are 
given in the appendix. 
     
Employment level and volatility 
The reasoning above and in section 3 suggests that there may be a trade-off 
between the steady state level of employment and its volatility, that is, product 
market integration may increase the employment level (lower structural 
unemployment) but increase employment volatility. Since the wage mark-up is 
reduced it is to be expected that the long run equilibrium level of employment 
goes up. At the same time the focus in wage setting shifts towards the wage of 
competitors (and therefore aggregate conditions within EU) and away from 
domestic conditions due to more strong wage interdependencies. Employment 
should therefore be expected to become more sensitive to asymmetric or 
country-specific shocks. The case of symmetric shocks is uninteresting in the 
present setting since all countries are assumed identical, i.e. interesting 
differences arise in the case of asymmetric shocks. Figure 5 shows how the 
steady state level of employment varies with the elasticity of demand, and figure 
6 displays how the volatility of employment (measured by the standard 
deviation of relative employment) to country-specific shocks depends on this 
elasticity. 
     
Figure 5: Steady state employment: 
Flexible wages and country-specific shocks 
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Figure 6: Volatility of employment: 
Flexible wages and country-specific shocks 
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  While the effect on steady state employment levels off, the volatility keeps 
increasing in the elasticity of demand (θ). Although the quantitative effects are 
to be interpreted cautiously the numerical illustrations do underscore one point, 
namely, that if the level effects are important so are the effects on volatility of 
employment to country-specific shocks. That is, even moderate increases in the 
elasticity (θ) can increase the volatility of employment relative to its mean 
significantly.  
     
Figure 7: Relation of employment volatility to employment level 
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Nominal Rigidities: One-Period Contracts 
If wages are rigid they will not take any burden of adjustment in the short run, 
and this will accordingly lead to higher volatility of employment. Figure 8 
displays the volatility of employment to country-specific shocks in the case of 
flexible wages and rigid wages (the rigid wage is depicted by the solid line), and 
this confirms the standard observation that volatility is larger in the case with 
rigid wages. Important for the current discussion is the fact that this difference is 
increasing when product markets become more integrated, i.e. the consequences 
of rigidities in wage adjustment become larger, the more elastic labour demand 
is. 
     
Figure 8: Employment volatility: Flexible and rigid wages 
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  The case of one-period nominal contracting is also interesting since the 
wage rule implies (see Appendix) that the nominal wage increases are 
determined by expected consumer price inflation and expected changes in   17 
productivity, which is basically the wage formula underlying the Doorn 
initiative, cf.. section 2. The present analysis brings out that such a wage 
formula contributes to larger employment variability precisely because it makes 
domestic wage developments insensitive to local labour market developments. 
  Basing wage formation on such norms is furthermore problematic for a 
number of reasons. First, there are problems in respect to definition of variables 
and whether the application of the formula should be backward (realized values 
of inflation and productivity) or forward (expected values of inflation and 
productivity) looking. It is also not clear whether it should be based on euro 
wide inflation or local inflation. Second, although the rationale for such norms is 
to ensure an unchanged income share to labour, such norms suffer from the 
problem that they tend to be self-fulfilling when firms adapt employment to 
ensure that the real product wage corresponds to the marginal productivity of 
labour. Ex post the norm would thus tend to hold
8, but imposing it in a rigid way 
ex-ante is not necessarily conducive for employment creation. 
  Whereas nominal contracting here simply is taken for granted it is worth 
pointing out that explanations of nominal rigidities running in terms of costs of 
changing wages/prices or of acquiring the relevant information on which to base 
adjustments find that the stronger the strategic complementarity the larger the 
incentive to maintain rigid wages (understood in the sense that the interval of 
realizations of shocks supporting rigid wages increases), see e.g. Ball and Romer 
(1991). That is, with strong wage interdependencies it is more likely that wages 
remain rigid in a given labour market if they are rigid in other labour markets 
and vice versa. This implies that wage rigidities may be further strengthened as a 
consequence of product market integration. 
     
Nominal Rigidities: Non-coordinated wage determination 
Current wage setting arrangements in Europe must be characterized as highly 
non-coordinated, cf.. table 1. Different labour market institutions mix with a 
variety of contract lengths etc. and this implies that wage decisions are not 
coordinated neither in time nor space. Non-coordinated wage setting may have 
important implications for the adjustment process over time to shocks as has 
been documented in models featuring the coordination problem arising when 
e.g. wage decisions are not coordinated in time (see e.g. Taylor (1999), 
Andersen (1998), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000)). The simplest case of 
non-coordinated wage setting is that of asynchronized two-period contracts
9, 
which has been extensively analysed in recent work on the propagation 
mechanisms in business cycle models. 
    A recent strand of the business cycle literature has addressed the role of price 
and wage rigidities in causing persistence in the adjustment process. 
Specifically, it has been analysed what role asynchronized nominal wage (or 
price) setting has for the adjustment to shocks over time (see e.g. Taylor (1999)). 
It is still open to debate how quantitatively strong the persistence generated 
solely by asynchronized nominal contracts is (see e.g. Chari, Kehoe and 
McGrattan (2000)), but there is no doubt that non-coordinated wage (and price) 
decisions is an important cause of persistence in the adjustment process. For the 
present debate the important point is that stronger interdependencies in wage 
and price decisions strengthen the persistence generated by e.g. non-coordinated 
wage adjustments. In a closed economy model Erceg (1997) shows that the 
closer the substitution between different types of labour and therefore the 
                                                 
8 In the standard text book case of a Cobb-Douglas production technology this holds precisely 
and the wage share is constant irrespective of wage setting. 
 
9 Extending to overlapping n-period contracts do not seem to have important quantitative 
implications, see e.g. Andersen and Beier (2003).   18 
stronger the wage interdependencies between the wage setting groups, the 
stronger the persistence in the adjustment process. In an open economy context 
it is shown in Andersen and Beier (2003) that the stronger the wage and price 
interdependencies the more persistent the adjustment to shocks. Since product 
market integration is going to strengthen wage interdependencies between 
labour markets in different countries, it follows that a consequence of this may 
be more persistence or sluggishness in the adjustment to shocks. This is yet 
another channel through which product market integration may reduce labour 
market flexibility, although it may contribute to an increase in the steady-state 
employment level (or equivalently a reduction in structural unemployment). 
  To illustrate this point consider the implications of non-coordinated wage 
determination across European countries by introducing two-period staggered 
contracts in the model used here for illustrative purposes (see appendix for 
details). As shown in the appendix an increase in the demand elasticity - the 
proxy for product market integration used here - implies that wage adjustment 
becomes more sluggish in the sense that current wages come to depend more 
strongly on past wages (despite forward looking expectations formation), that is, 
the adjustment process to shocks becomes slower and therefore the 
consequences of various shocks become more persistent. Figure 9 shows the 
impulse response function for wages to a permanent change in productivity, and 
it is seen that wages react more sluggishly to changes in productivity when 
demand is more elastic, i.e. when product markets are more tightly integrated. 
     
     
Figure 9 
     
Impulse response function: 
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Impulse response function: 














low elasticity of demand high elasticity of demand
 
 
Figure 10 displays the impulse response function to a temporary shock, and it is 
seen that wage on impact reacts less and the adjustment process is slower the 
more elastic is in demand. An implication is that wages are less sensitive to 
temporary changes but also more sluggish to overcome the consequences of 
such changes, the more integrated product markets are. 
        To sum up, it has been shown that effects of product market integration 
tending to increase the elasticity of labour demand tends to increase the mean 
level of employment but also it volatility and the persistence in the adjustment 
process. An interesting issue for further research is whether these effects also 
arises when it is taken into account that international integration may be one of 
the forces for more decentralized wage formation (see section 3). Moreover, 
empirical work on changes in demand elasticities is important.
10 
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
 
Product market structures are important also for labour market performance, and 
accordingly product market integration may have implications for labour market 
performance, even if labour is not very mobile across European labour markets. 
Labour market performance (structural unemployment, flexibility etc.) is of 
utmost importance in its own right. Moreover strong interdependencies are 
being built between integrating economies and therefore labour market 
performance in one country is of importance to its trading partners through 
various channels. A further aspect is that for countries within the euro area there 
may be a need for greater wage flexibility to compensate for lack of national 
monetary policy instruments to cope with country-specific shocks. 
  For all of these reasons it is an important question whether there are forces 
inherent in the integration process which work to improve labour market 
performance. Would the adaption to the consequences of integration and in 
particular product market integration be alike a structural labour market reform 
                                                 
10 Slaughter (2001) presents evidence on changes in labour demand elasticities and 
find some evidence that they have increased. However, the results arises from 
estimating conditional (on output) labour demand relations implying that the product 
market link important to the discussion in this paper and the general debate about 
consequences of product market integration for labour markets is ruled out.   20 
leading to improved labour market performance, or would labour market 
rigidities and heterogeneities across European countries be an impediment to 
reaping the benefits of further integration and be an obstacle to the smooth 
functioning of the euro area. 
  Product market integration can be expected to have mixed consequences for 
labour market performance. On the one hand tighter integration and product 
market competition may be expected through various channels to lower wage 
mark-ups and therefore lead to an increase in the employment level (reduction in 
structural unemployment). On the other hand stronger wage interdependencies 
across labour markets follow from the same mechanisms and this tends to foster 
wage rigidities and persistence (given asynchronized wage setting) which in turn 
may lead to more volatility in employment. As a consequence asymmetries in 
business cycle fluctuations across integrating countries may be reinforced 
despite stronger trade links. 
  Accordingly, product market integration only resembles an (implicit) 
structural labour market reform in one dimension - it is good news for the 
structural unemployment level, but it is bad news for business cycle fluctuations 
since it implies that activity becomes more sensitivity to country-specific 
shocks. 
  Product market integration will therefore not eliminate the need for 
structural labour market reforms and the tension concerning stabilization of 
(asymmetric shocks) may increase. It is sometimes argued that the main issue is 
to make wage developments across European labour markets consistent with the 
monetary policy objective of low and stable inflation. This is, however, a very 
imprecise yardstick by which to evaluate the importance of labour market 
structures. First, to the extent that the monetary policy objective is pursued 
rigorously the issue is not to make wage development consistent with low and 
stable inflation, but rather at what level of unemployment wage formation is 
consistent with the inflation target. Second, informal coordination on wage 
setting via e.g. strong norm building in wage setting (like the formula or norm 
calling for wage increases to equal inflation plus productivity growth) may be 
detrimental to more smoothly working labour markets, since it reinforces wage 
interdependencies in wage setting, and therefore leads to large sensitivity of 
employment to country-specific or asymmetric shocks. Such norms may thus be 
conducive to nominal convergence but come at the cost of less real convergence. 
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